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Abstract— Threat of cybercrime is a growing danger to 
the economy. Industries and businesses are targeted by 
cyber-criminals along with members of the general 
public. Since cybercrime is often a symptom of more 
complex criminological regimes such as laundering, 
trafficking and terrorism, the true damage caused to 
society is unknown. Dissimilarities in reporting 
procedures and non-uniform cybercrime classifications 
lead international reporting bodies to produce 
incompatible results which cause difficulties in making 
valid comparisons. A cybercrime classification 
framework has been identified as necessary for the 
development of an inter-jurisdictional, transnational, 
and global approach to identify, intercept, and 
prosecute cyber-criminals. Outlined in this paper is a 
cybercrime classification framework which has been 
applied to the incidence of scams. Content analysis was 
performed on over 250 scam descriptions stemming 
from in excess of 35 scamming categories and over 80 
static features derived. Using hierarchical cluster and 
discriminant function analysis, the sample was reduced 
from over 35 ambiguous categories into 7 scam types 
and the top four scamming functions - identified as 
scamming business processes, revealed. The results of 
this research bear significant ramifications to the 
current state of scam and cybercrime classification, 
research and analysis, as well as offer significant 
insight into the business processes and applications 
adopted by scammers and cyber-criminals.   
Keywords—Agglomerative, business process, 
classification, cybercrime, cyberscam, divisive, 
framework, static feature. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Many organisations affected by cybercrime have 
their own incident classification systems that 
operate using an agglomerative approach which 
involves breaking down events in order to 
understand their components. While this is useful to 
the parent organisation, these do not translate                                                                    
across platforms to allow for multi-party adoption 
which means that collaboration between sectors is 
near impossible. In contrast to this, the cybercrime 
classification framework outlined in this paper 
offers a combined agglomerative - divisive 
methodology which reconstructs deconstructed 
events in order to understand its processes. Unlike 
current criminological approaches, the method 
 
 
applied in the cybercrime classification framework 
is designed to be multidisciplinary and adaptable 
across sectors. 
 The objective of this research is to determine a 
classification system that can be used by various 
parties to refer to similar types of scams in 
international cybercrime. Inconsistencies in the 
cybercrime lexicon have regularly been reported as 
a reason behind insubstantial cross border liaisons 
[1], [2] incongruent transnational cooperation and 
unsuccessful investigations leading towards 
increasing cybercrime incidents [3]. This in turn 
causes congestion of law enforcement and industry 
resources [3], [6]. 
A cybercrime classification framework (CCF) 
would assist in formalising a language of 
cybercrime remaining consistent within jurisdictions 
and uniform across multi-national platforms. Such 
consistency would assist authorities by enhancing 
communication and cooperation between 
jurisdictions both at home and across national 
borders, as well as provide compatibility between 
cybercrime reporting agencies, allowing for a true 
representation of cybercrime incidence to be 
realised internationally.  
By utilising the cybercrime classification 
framework outlined in this paper, 7 genres of scams 
were identified along with four primary scammer 
business processes. This information can be used by 
law enforcement agencies and dedicated cybercrime 
and fraud task forces in their identification, tracking 
and monitoring of cybercrimes and a contribution is 
made towards the utilisation of mixed 
methodologies for investigating cybercrime. This 
paper is divided into 6 subsequent sections; 
Motivation, where the motivation behind this 
research is discussed, Report Analysis, where an 
overview of cybercrime statistics and comparisons 
between reporting institutions and cybercrime 
research is presented, Methodology, where the 
methodology applied in this research is presented, 
Results, where the investigative results are detailed, 
Discussion, where a comprehensive discussion of 
the significance of the research and its results is 
considered, and Conclusion, where final remarks 
are made.  
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II. MOTIVATION 
Lack of uniformity and inconsistency in scam 
classification has been identified as an ongoing 
concern since the 1990’s [1]. Strong evidence is 
presented [2] citing breadth of variation in scam 
classification among international and national scam 
reporting institutions, such as the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics (ABS), the Internet Crime Complaint 
Center (iC3), and the Environics Research Group 
(ERG). Further to this, large variation in scam 
classification is regularly identified as a primary 
cause of discrepancy in victim report data, and 
identified as an area in need of investigation [1], [2], 
[3], [4], [5]. These inconsistencies are reported as 
symptoms of ineffective scam identification and low 
rates of interception by law enforcement agencies 
resulting in the poor prosecution rates of scammers 
[6].  
Confusion, uncertainty, and false negatives are 
the consequences of such discrepancy in scam 
classifications leading to more complex concerns, 
such as the under-reporting of scam incidence, 
reduced rates of successful follow up by 
investigative and law enforcement agencies and 
difficulty in making correct referrals [2], [6]. The 
blurred boundaries of scam classification are 
inherent throughout anti-fraud legislation, which the 
criminals seemingly exploit to their advantage [7]. 
While transnational investigative bodies dealing 
with the complexities of working beyond home 
borders and interacting with multiple jurisdictions 
face compounding challenges stemming from these 
issues [5], [6], [7].  
During 1998 Glenn Wahlert from the Australian 
Federal Police (AFP) presented a paper at the 
Internet Crime Conference (ICC) where concerns 
surrounding the escalating adoption of computer 
technologies for business operations and personal 
use emerged [1]. During this time, technology based 
crimes were predominantly computer assisted 
crimes; these were crimes in which technology was 
the target of the attack, such as infecting an end-
users machine with malicious code [1].  
Wahlert [1] described technology based crimes 
beyond tech-as-target crimes by identifying areas of 
potential exploitation by cyber-criminals; the 
banking and finance sector, laundering, 
counterfeiting, trafficking, sexually related crimes, 
gambling, tactical intelligence, and scams [1]. 
Primary concerns surrounding the issues of 
anonymity, mass communicability, jurisdictional 
impedances, and cultural ambiguities were 
identified as high priority themes in need of 
committed research.   
Effective mechanisms for the identification and 
monitoring of technology based crimes were 
identified as necessary for controlling technological 
exploitation. Further to this, it was suggested that 
the development of transnational agencies 
authorised to operate across jurisdictions were 
imperative to fight the phenomena [1].  
The current lack of consistency in cyberscam 
classifications impede coordinated operations and 
make cross jurisdictional comparisons of scam 
incidence impossible [7], [2]. A cybercrime 
classification framework would aid in the detection, 
interception and prosecution of cyber-criminals.  
The discrepancies between reporting institutions 
are briefly discussed in the next section 
 
III. REPORT ANALYSIS 
The iC3 2008 Internet Crime Report found that 
the reported incidence of cyberscams increased by 
33.1% from 2007 [8]. Reports of scam incidence 
were recorded all throughout the United States with 
complaints received from as far abroad as Australia. 
Victim ages ranged from 10 years to 100 years and 
the total dollar loss was reported to be $264.6 
million, an increase of $25.51 million from 2007 
[8], [9].  
The iC3 only reports on cases where a monetary 
loss was recorded, and as such only recognises 
instances of fraud as those where a financial loss 
has been incurred. The assumption that fraud 
encompasses only a monetary disadvantage is not 
representative of the broad and complex nature of 
cybercrime. The IC3 identified seven types of scams 
stemming from nine different categories of 
complaint.  
During 2008, the ABS released the results from 
its first ever personal fraud survey [4]. A recorded 
dollar loss of $AUD980 million was attributable to 
incidences of personal fraud alone. While personal 
fraud remained undefined by the ABS, it was 
dissected into two categories of victimisation; these 
were ‘scams’ and ‘identity fraud’. A person was 
recorded as being scammed if they responded to a 
scam by supplying information and/or money [4]. 
To become a victim of identity fraud, the victim 
must have had their personal details used by another 
person without their consent [4].  
A distinction is identified between incidence of 
identity fraud and incidence of identity theft [2] and 
it is argued that before identity fraud can transpire, 
identity theft must first occur [10], this detail was 
not recorded by the ABS.   
It is recorded that 23.5 million people within the 
UK were the target of a scamming event [11], this, 
represented 48% of all UK residents at the time of 
the mass marketing fraud report and an estimated 
total dollar loss per year is offered with the amount 
of £3.5 billion. 
A detailed overview of the state of fraud in 
Australia describing a clear and present hierarchy of 
fraudster crimes [6] implies an interconnectedness 
between fraud and scam events. Prenzler and Hayes 
[6] suggest that jurisdictional inconsistencies and 
variations in fraud conceptualisation are responsible 
for the inadequate view of fraud present in society 
today. This inadequate view is fuelled by a sole-
source research base which extends from published 
and incompatible victim report data collected from 
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across the globe. It is recognised that without 
standardisation of estimation and calculation led by 
consistent classifications, an understanding of the 
true impact of fraudster crimes and in particular, 
cybercrime, cannot be realised.  
A Framework for Data Mining [12] discussed 
such approaches as association analysis, 
classification, prediction, and cluster analysis. The 
applied study was a supervised study which began 
by ranking crimes based on their perceived public 
harm. Fraud achieved fifth place while cybercrime 
gained first place in the ranking statistics. Pattern 
visualisation techniques were recommended as the 
best approach for analysis of cybercrimes [12].  
Routine activities theory (RAT) re-emerged as a 
promising theoretical perspective during 2005 [13] 
and was applied to incidents of crime in hopes of 
understanding crime distributions. In 2008, it was 
proposed that RAT and lifestyle-exposure theory 
(LET) could be utilised for cybercrime by assessing 
computer crime victimisation rates [14]. The 
conclusion suggested that a hybrid of RAT and LET 
could be used to identify potential targets of 
computer crime based on online lifestyle and digital 
guardianship markers [14].  
 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
Hierarchical clustering analysis presents a 
method of modelling hierarchies within observed 
data. It has been suggested that a hierarchy of fraud 
exists [6] which implies that a hierarchy of scams 
also exists, this can also be inferred for the realm of 
cybercrime. These hierarchies can be investigated 
by applying hierarchical analytical techniques such 
as hierarchical cluster analyses on purpose driven 
data. The aim of this research is to investigate the 
presence of hierarchy within scam-based data and 
this is achieved through the derivation and analysis 
of scam static features. Following the pattern 
recognition phase of analysis, model verification is 
performed by applying discriminant function 
analysis to the clustering results.  
The proposed method used in the divisively 
breaks the scams down into their static features and 
agglomeratively reconstructs scams based upon 
their identified static components, this allows for the 
determination of the business processes underlying 
cybercrimes. This approach takes into account each 
instance of cyber-crime in its whole form and 
through a process of deconstruction, static elements 
– the building blocks foundational to the processes 
and compilation of each crime are revealed. Once 
cybercrime cases are deconstructed to a state of 
static feature elements, cases are agglomeratively 
clustered based upon similarity of static features and 
cybercrime genres are revealed. This method has 
been applied to scam cases sourced from national 
and international institutions and a summary of the 
results of the CCF methodology appear below. 
Over 250 scam cases sourced from 14 different 
scam reporting agencies and annual reports (see 
Table 1 in Appendix) were individually analysed 
for static features with each scam’s resultant 
composition of static features recorded in the vector 
space. Following cluster and discriminant function 
analysis, similar scam cases were grouped 
according to similarity of static feature composition 
and it was determined that 7 scam genres exist, 
significantly less than the recorded 38 identified by 
the scam sources. Significant scam identifying 
features were recognised and these can be used to 
identify and classify new scams as they emerge.  
Scam descriptions offer a rich source of 
information pertaining to the reporting institution’s 
understanding of individual schemes. From 
analysing the content of a scam description, a 
detailed representation of scam processes can be 
understood. The purpose of the analysis performed 
here was to identify homogeneous subsets of scam 
cases. This was achieved through the use of 
hierarchical clustering analysis and discriminant 
function analysis. The aim of this research was to 
formulate clusters of scam cases derived from 
similarity matching principles based upon the 
purposely derived static features of scam 
descriptions. It was hypothesized that a smaller 
number of scam clusters could be found than the 
publicly acknowledged 38 which were recorded 
during the data collection phase.  
Furthest neighbour hierarchical clustering using 
the Jaccard binary coefficient was used to partition 
similar scams. This method of clustering was 
selected for use because of its natural tendency to 
find homogeneous subsets within a data set [15]. 
The furthest neighbour is a method of complete 
linkage and a description of this appears below in 
Figure A. For complete linkage the distance 
between the furthest pair of cases from separate 
groups is considered. This approach is an 
agglomerative approach where data is partitioned 
according to Pn, Pn-1,…,P1. Where Pn is a single 
case or cluster and P1 contains all cases.  
The Jaccard coefficient is a binary distance 
measure and is calculated by a / (a+b+c), where a = 
the presence of same features in both cases, b = the 
presence of features in case 1 and the absence of 
those same features in case 2, and c = the absence of 
features in case 1 and the presence of those same 
features in case 2.  
 
FigureACompleteLinkage
The memberships of scam clusters were 
recorded and a dendrogram and bar charts 
tabulating the frequencies within each cluster were 
created (see Figure 1 and 2 in the Appendix). The 
result of the hierarchical cluster model was 
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evaluated and verified using a discriminant function 
analysis.  
The goal of the discriminant function analysis 
was to assess the reliability of the model where a 
reliable model was defined as a model in which the 
(n-1) discriminant functions combined account for 
at least 95% of variability within the data. A model 
which accounted for at least 95% of variability 
could then be claimed to be at least 95% accurate. 
Another goal of the discriminant function analysis 
was to identify which scam static features were 
significant to cluster membership prediction.  
 
V. RESULTS 
The cluster solution which was accurate at least 
95% of the time and contained the fewest number of 
clusters would satisfy the constraints of the 
investigation. Using the furthest neighbour Jaccard 
coefficient hierarchical cluster model and removing 
all insignificant static features, the 250+ scam cases 
from 38 scam categories could be clustered into 
only 7 clusters of scam types - called scam genres, 
whilst achieving 95% accuracy.  Of the 82 scam 
static features derived, 68 were found to be 
significant to the variation in the model and thus 
impacted the placement of scam cases into scam 
clusters (see Table 3, 4, and 5 in the Appendix).  
The validation of the furthest neighbour, Jaccard 
coefficient hierarchical clustering model for scam-
based research carries implications for the usability 
of text-based publicly accessible data in mixed 
methodological analysis. These results also confirm 
the variability of scam descriptions across 
jurisdictions and provide evidence for the necessity 
for the standardisation of terminology. 
These results confirm that the fewest number of 
clusters with the least number of scam 
memberships, inferring homogeneity across clusters 
and among cases is 7, and scam cases can be 
accurately allocated to a scam genre (cluster) 95% 
of the time using the furthest neighbour, Jaccard 
coefficient hierarchical clustering model. 
Over two hundred and fifty individual scam 
cases and 82 purposely derived scam static features 
belonging to 38 separate source classified scam 
genre categories were analysed using an 
unsupervised agglomerative furthest neighbour, 
Jaccard coefficient hierarchical clustering model 
which was verified and tested for reliability by a 
discriminant function analysis.  
This method achieved 95% accuracy in 
partitioning scam cases into scam genres. The 38 
source classified scam genres were reduced down to 
only 7 scam genres which were Financial Gain 
through Low Level Trickery, Financial Gain and 
Information Gathering through Developed Story 
Based Applications, Participation and Information 
Gathering through Employment Based Strategies, 
Financial Gain through Implied Necessary 
Obligation, Information Gathering through 
Legitimate Looking Appeals, Financial Gain 
through Merchant and Customer Based 
Exploitation, and Financial Gain and Information 
Gathering through Marketing Opportunities.  
It was discovered that only 68 of the 82 scam 
static features were required to achieve a 95% level 
of accuracy in scam membership and the most 
prominent of these static features were what the 
scam offered, the role of the victim, the goal of the 
scammer, and the method of scam introduction.  
It is demonstrated that scams are currently over 
classified within current literature and that only 7 
scam types or scam genres exist compared to the 38 
recorded source-classified scam categories.  
 
VI. DISCUSSION 
1.  Financial Gain through Low Level 
Trickery 
The first scam genre contains 72 scam cases 
which are detailed in the appendix.  This scam 
genre is made up of scam cases that involve the 
most basic forms of trickery. These involve scams 
that are not necessarily thorough in planning and 
detail. Victims falling for scam genre one scams 
would take people and communications at face 
value and not expend time or energy on 
investigating scam claims or the people behind 
them. These scams target the individual or company 
for once off transactions initially and where 
possible, if there were potential for the scam to be 
extended to elicit more funds from the victim, this 
may be pursued.  
Scam genre 1 contains scams are at the most 
basic level after the victim’s cash or ability to get 
loans. Door to door scams often involve the 
soliciting of services that are paid for and never 
performed. Psychic and clairvoyant scams involve 
the soliciting of services or merchandise that is paid 
for and is not what it had promised to be. Cheque 
overpayment scams involve the overpayment for a 
purchase and a request for the balance to be wired 
back to the sender. In this situation, the cheque is 
fraudulent and the scammer walks away with the 
victim’s money after they have refunded the 
difference and financial advice scams involve 
soliciting supposed financial advice for an upfront 
fee. Whether or not the advice is useful is irrelevant 
since the victim has just paid a scammer and the 
scammer has walked away with the victim’s money 
and possibly their personal and private details to use 
in a future identity based scam. Similarity among 
scams found in scam genre 1 emerge, the most 
obvious is the payment of funds to the scammer. 
2. Financial Gain and Information Gathering 
through Developed Story Based 
Applications 
The second scam genre contains 74 scam cases. 
This scam genre is made up of scam cases that 
involve complex planning and detail. These scams 
hinge on the opportunistic nature of the general 
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public as well as the scammer. In this sense a 
common bond is formed between the scammer and 
their victims and that is opportunity. The first scam 
in scam genre 2 is the charity scam. This scam relies 
on the poverty and necessity of others, this scam 
also emerges during natural or manmade disaster. 
These scams rely on assumed public knowledge of a 
cohort of individuals or a global tragedy. They are 
story based scams and offer to their victims the 
opportunity to make a difference in the world 
through financial assistance.  
The ultimate goal of the scams found in scam 
genre 2 is money, the same as scam genre 1 
however, the method of realising this goal is 
different. The grouping of unexpected prizes and 
chain letters together with charity scams and 
Nigerian 419 scams suggests some similarity in 
scam perpetrations; further investigation might 
prove useful in determining on what grounds these 
scams are alike. This may be due to the story based 
nature of all of these scams. Another goal which 
manifests in dating and romance scams, Nigerian 
419 scams, and even spam offers is the collection of 
personal or private information.  
3. Participation and Information Gathering 
through Employment Based Strategies 
The third scam genre contains 22 scam cases. 
This scam genre is made up of scam cases that 
involve complex planning and detail, similar to that 
found in scam genre 2 however, the scams in scam 
genre 3 target the individual in the sense that they 
seek participation from victims. Each scam listed in 
scam genre three involves a level of victim 
‘employment’ in which the victim participates in the 
scheme; normally a laundering scam, and for their 
participation they are financially rewarded. These 
scams can often lead to identity theft and other 
identity based crimes since in becoming involved in 
one of these scams the victim may have been an 
applicant for what they had believed was an 
authentic employment opportunity. With their 
application, the victim would have supplied the 
scammer/s with a full working and educational 
history, full name and date of birth as well as bank 
account details.  
4. Financial Gain through Implied Necessary 
Obligation 
The fourth scam genre contains 17 scam cases. 
This scam genre is made up of scam cases that 
require victim call backs or responses for the scam 
to be successful. The scams found here are different 
to those seen in scam genre one, two, and three. 
Most of these scams rely on alternative technologies 
to that of the Internet and World Wide Web for 
dissemination. There are a mixture of scams here 
that aim to trick the victim into a response and thus 
facing un-expected and unrealised charges. 
Regardless of the method of the scam, or the role of 
the victim, this scam genre contains scams that aim 
to make money from the victim in ways that would 
seem necessary or pertinent to the situation. 
5.  Information Gathering through Apparently 
Authentic Appeals 
The fifth scam genre contains 38 scam cases. 
This scam genre is made up of scam cases that 
involve high level knowledge of how systems 
operate and contains those scams that are 
syntactically driven such as spyware and key logger 
scams. This scam genre also contains scams that 
seek information for the purpose of identity related 
crimes such as identity theft and credit/debit card 
fraud. The reason why syntactic scams using 
spyware and key loggers are clustered along with 
identity theft and credit/debit card scams is because 
syntactic attacks are dispersed with the goal of 
gathering victim identity credentials or other forms 
of information. Therefore, spyware and key logging 
scams are identified as a tool for the success of 
information gathering scams such as identity theft 
and credit/debit card scams. Also found in scam 
genre 5 are phishing scams which are also 
synonymous with identity theft and credit/debit card 
fraud.  
6. Financial Gain through Merchant and 
Customer Based Exploitation 
The sixth scam genre contains 24 scam cases. 
This scam genre is made up of scam cases that 
incorporate the roles of both the seller and buyer in 
the scam description. These scams are all 
transaction based scams involving a buyer and a 
seller; shill bidding, bid shielding, merchandise 
non-delivery, payment non-delivery, and product 
authenticity. The goal of this group of scams is 
financial gain which is achieved through various 
versions and applications of similarly styled scams. 
These scams are well researched and developed 
even though the victim and scammer only 
communicate for a short period of time.  
7. Financial Gain and Information Gathering 
through Marketing Opportunities 
The final scam genre is scam genre 7 which 
contains 30 scam cases. This scam genre is made up 
of scam cases that involve the exploitation of 
investment opportunities and contains a mixture of 
scam types including Ponzi and pyramid, identity 
theft, computer prediction software, investment 
seminars, charity fraud, affinity fraud, get rich quick 
scams and 419 advance fee fraud. Without further 
detailed analysis of the inter-connected nature of the 
suite of compiled static features fitting into this 
category, the presence of this mixture of scam titles 
is interpreted as hinging on the suggestion of 
investment opportunities within each scam case. 
The scams within scam genre 7 are marketed as 
money making opportunities, whether through 
investment, business opportunity, shares or 
gambling. However, the goal of the scammer is 
financial gain and in some instances this extends to 
information gathering.  
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8. The Top Four Scammer Business Processes 
The top four cybercriminal business processes 
were identified and these account for the majority of 
the variation in scam genre placement which means 
that a scam’s type can be identified early on in the 
scamming process by these 4 static features. By 
acknowledging these static features, the type of 
scam a scheme is can be confidently identified and 
future paths of communication and transaction flow 
can then be projected leading the way to the positive 
mapping of scam case progress and the 
identification of optimum paths of interception by 
law enforcement.  
While it would be over confident to suggest that 
intercepting scam communications and transactions 
will lead to scammer prosecution, by identifying 
and projecting the business processes involved in 
scamming communications and transactions, 
optimum paths of interception causing the greatest 
damage to the scammer exhausting their time and 
funds can be realised.   
The four most significant static features crucial 
to the successful scam campaign and therefore, the 
most important business processes that scammers 
build their schemes upon are: a) what the scam 
offers, b) the role of the victim, c) the goal of the 
scammer, and d) method of scam introduction.  
If a cybercriminal were to begin planning a new 
scam campaign, these are the priority features that 
would need to be known and addressed by the 
scammer during the business development phase. 
Before launching a campaign, the scammer must 
know what he/she seeks, they must have an end 
goal decided, knowing this, the scammer develops a 
scam campaign which will deliver the desired 
outcome.  
From knowledge of the desired outcome, the 
scammer must then decide on how he/she will 
introduce the scam to the target, further to this, 
contingencies would be made on how to reach as 
many targets as necessary to meet and exceed the 
intended goal. The scammer must know how to get 
the target involved in the scam, to do this, the scam 
must offer something of value to the target and 
finally, before the campaign can be finalised, the 
scammer must know what role he/she would play in 
the campaign, and therefore, what role the target 
will play.  
By identifying these four key elements of the 
cybercriminal’s business process, scams can be 
confidently identified and acted upon by the 
relevant authorities early on in the scamming 
campaign. Most importantly and in most cases, 
these key features can be identified from the very 
first scam communication, which means that the 
CCF methodology can be used as a tool for 
identifying possible scam communications before 
an incident of scamming even occurs. This can be 
demonstrated with the following example:  
“Dear Beloved Friend, I am Mrs Lovelin 
Vincent, I was married to Late Chief Vincent 
Williams a government contractor I have the sum of 
US$5.5m which I inherited from my late husband 
before he was killed by unknown people on his way 
returning from a business trip.  I want this money to 
be transfer in an account in your country for charity, 
widow's and church in your area. 
 God bless you and your family 
 Yours in the Lord.”  
The above is an example of what is usually 
termed a 419 scam. In this example, the scammer is 
pretending to be the widow of an influential man 
who was tragically killed and who now has a 
substantial sum of money that she wishes to donate 
to those charities within the intended victim’s 
vicinity. This is the first communication of this 419 
scam and the business processes used by the 
scammer can be identified as: a) what the scam 
offers – money, a chance to offer assistance, b) the 
role of the victim – randomly chosen and if the 
scam were to eventuate, the victim would assume 
the role of a third party or ‘courier’ to transfer and 
disseminate the supposed funds, c) the goal of the 
scammer – to gain access to the victim’s bank 
account details and take their money, and d) method 
of scam introduction – email communication.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The cybercrime classification framework (CCF) 
can be expanded to incorporate all current and 
future forms of cybercrime. The ease with which the 
framework can be updated will assist authorities, 
industry and business in remaining constantly 
prepared with the most up to date and relevant 
information available on the instances of and types 
of cybercrimes circulating the Internet and targeting 
corporate operations and individuals.  
Due to the user friendly nature of the CCF, it 
can easily be adopted by small to large businesses 
and the industrial sector to consistently and 
effectively manage and communicate their 
experiences of cybercrime to the authorities. 
Individual agencies can map their existing known 
schemes into the CCF and the authorities can use 
the CCF to develop consistent terms for further 
defining within the prosecution process as well as 
use the CCF to enhance transnational cooperation 
and coordination.  
The adoption of the cybercrime classification 
framework for state and federal reporting 
institutions would also encourage collaboration and 
useful interpretation of scam and cybercrime based 
statistics to give meaningful, accurate and up to date 
evaluations of cyber-based incidents and finally, the 
CCF methodology described here would improve 
the efficiency in identifying, tracking and 
monitoring cybercrimes. 
 
APPENDIX 
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Table1:Scamsourceanditsfrequencycontributionto
thesample
 

Table2:Listofderivedscamstaticfeatures
 
 
Table3:DFAequalityofgroup
means
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Figure1:Frequencybarchartsofscamclustermemberships
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Table4:DFAEigenvalues
 

Table5:DFATestsofsignificance
 
Table6:Scamgenre1
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Table7:Scamgenre2

Table8:Scamgenre3
 
 
Table9:Scamgenre4
 
Table10:Scamgenre5
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Table11:Scamgenre6
 
Table12:Scamgenre7
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